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PEOPLE V HARRIS'
(decided July 9, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In People v. Harris,2 the New York Court of Appeals vacated the
first death sentence imposed pursuant to New York's death penalty
statute since its enactment in 1995.3 Writing for a six-member ma-
jority, Judge Wesley upheld defendant Harris' conviction, but re-
manded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. 4 Judge Smith,
who concurred in part and dissented in part, voted to reverse the
trial court and order a new trial.
II. BACKGROUND
On December 7, 1996, defendant Darrel K. Harris entered a
Brooklyn social club and committed a violent crime.5 After a few
minutes at the club, Harris pulled out a gun, instructed everybody
to get on the floor, and give him their money. 6 He took money
from one individual and then unexpectedly began to shoot three
people and stab another. Three people died and one person seri-
ously wounded. Harris was indicted on six counts of first-degree
felony murder,7 six counts of first-degree same-transaction murder8
and several other related offenses. On May 23, 1997, the District
Attorney of Kings County filed a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty.9 At trial, Harris acknowledged responsibility for the
crimes, but argued that he committed the acts under extreme emo-
1. 98 N.Y.2d 452 (2002).
2. Id.
3. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 470.30 (3) (b) (Consol. 2002).
4. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 471.
5. Id. at 471.
6. Id. at 471.
7. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii) (McKinney 2002). When Harris de-
manded money from Eddie Brown at gunpoint, the crime became the aggravated of-
fense of felony-murder under New York Penal Law, authorizing the prosecution to seek
the death penalty. Id.
8. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (1) (a) (viii) (McKinney 2002).
9. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452.
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tional disturbance, 10 which is an affirmative defense to first-degree
murder in New York.I t The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all
six first-degree murder counts, attempted first-degree murder
counts, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.' 2 At
the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury returned a
sentence of death.
13
Harris appealed to the New York Court of Appeals pursuant to
New York Criminal Procedure Law §450.30(1)and(2) which pro-
vides for the automatic appeal of all death sentences directly to the
New York Court of Appeals. 14 In his appeal, Harris alleged that the
New York death penalty statute was unconstitutional, and therefore,
his sentence was unconstitutional under Matter of Hynes v. Tomei.'
5
III. DISCUSSION
Upon review, the New York Court of Appeals took into account
several important issues including whether: (1) the jury's decision
to impose the death sentence was against the weight of the evi-
dence; 16 (2) the death sentence was impermissibly "imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary or legally
10. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452.
11. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (2)(a) (McKinney 2002).
12. People v. Harris, 666 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
13. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452. Under New York law, following a conviction of a defen-
dant for the offense of murder in the first degree, a trial court must promptly conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole or death. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (Mc-
Kinney 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00 (5) (McKinney 2002).
14. N.Y. CONST., art. VI, § 3(b); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 450.70 (1) (Consol. 2002).
The New York statute "confers a unique set of responsibilities" on the court of appeals.
People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452 (2002). Aside from having powers of intermediate ap-
pellate review the court of appeals must also review the factual basis for both the convic-
tion and the death sentence. See N.Y. CluM. PROC. LAw §§ 470.30 (1) and (2) (Consol.
2002); N.Y. CONST., art. VI, § 3(a).
15. Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1015
(1999). (Invalidating the plea bargaining provisions of the New York capital punish-
ment statute as a violation of the 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
because only defendants who chose to exercise their right to trial should be subject to
the of possibility of the death sentence.)
16. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470. 30 (3)(c) (Consol. 2002).
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impermissible factor;"17 and (3) the death sentence was excessive or
disproportionate to the penalties imposed in other similar cases.1 8
After announcing, "death is different"' 9 the court of appeals
began a "meticulous and thoughtful" analysis of defendant Harris'
arguments.20 The court analyzed the pre-trial motions, the selec-
tion ofjurors, and the admissibility of trial testimony, the trial court
jury instructions, and the general constitutional claims challenging
the New York death penalty statute.
A. Pre-Trial Motions
Among the several pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment,
the court only examined the grand jury instructions and felony-
murder classification.
2 1
1. Grand Jury Instructions on Intoxication
Harris argued that he was intoxicated when he committed the
charged crimes. 22 On appeal, he claimed that the prosecution's
failure to instruct the grand jury on intoxication was grounds to
dismiss the indictment.2 3 While intoxication is not a recognized de-
fense in New York, it can be offered by a defendant to negate an
element of a crime charged.
24
The court upheld the trial court's holding that an intoxication
instruction was not required in this case. 25 The court concluded
that intoxication is a mitigating defense, and the prosecution is
only required to instruct grand juries on exculpatory defenses. 26
Since potential exculpatory defenses may avoid unwarranted prose-
cutions or result in a finding of no criminal liability, the court held
17. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470. 30 (3)(c) (Consol. 2002).
18. Id.
19. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 474 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
20. Id. Due to the potentially far-reaching consequences of the court's deci-
sion(s), the state Attorney General intervened to defend the constitutionality of the
capital punishment statute.
21. Id. at 474.
22. Id. at 474.
23. Id. at 474.
24. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney 2002).
25. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 474.
26. Id.; People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 38 (1984).
20031
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that mitigating factors, such as intoxication, do not have the same
result because they can only reduce the gravity of the offense
committed.
27
2. Challenge to the Felony-Murder Classification
Harris also maintained that the felony-murder provision 28 irra-
tionally includes some felonies, rendering them death-eligible,
while excluding others. 29 In relying on Supreme Court precedent
30
that requires states to narrow the class of death-eligible persons on
a principled basis, the court found that the New York legislature
rationally excluded certain felonies in the felony-murder statute.
The legislature intended to include only those offenses that most
seriously affect society and the community,3 1 such as offenses




While Harris did not challenge the composition of the jury, he
contested the jury selection process on substantive and procedural
grounds.33 Harris argued that New York Penal Law §270.20 (1) (f)
("§270,20 (1) (f)") which excludes jurors whose views on the death
penalty are such that they would be committed to vote either for or
against a death sentence before trial, would disproportionately and
unlawfully exclude certain groups from the jury pool.34 This statu-
tory selection process, known as the life/death qualification, en-
sures that prospective jurors are able to consider both the death
penalty and a life sentence.
3 5
27. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 475; People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 29 (1986).
28. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii) (McKinney 2002).
29. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 475.
30. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
31. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 476 (citing Mem. of State Executive Department, 1995
McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., at 1781).
32. Id. at 476-77.
33. Id. at 477.
34. Id. at 477-78.
35. Id. The standard for excluding ineligible jurors for cause in capital cases in
New York is codified in N.Y. C.P.L. § 270.20(1) (f) (Consol. 2002).
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Harris claimed that the death qualification process should not
occur until after the guilt phase of the trial.36 In denying his mo-
tion, the trial court held that the statute did not violate the Federal
Constitution and subsequently, declined to determine if it violated
the New York State Constitution.37 The court of appeals upheld the
pre-trial death qualification process concluding that it serves a legit-
imate state interest: obtaining a single jury that can impartially ap-
ply the law to the facts at the guilt and sentencing phases of a
capital trial.
38
Additionally, the court noted that in Lockhart v. McCree, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the death qualifying process does not
deny a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.39 Ac-
cording to Lockhart, a potential juror may not be excluded unless
his views will prevent an impartial application of the law and facts.
40
Since the New York State Constitution 41 does not afford defendants
greater protection than the Sixth Amendment, Judge Wesley con-
cluded that Harris' challenge was without merit.
4 2
Nevertheless, Harris argued that New York jurisprudence pro-
vides greater protection on state constitutional grounds than the
U.S. Constitution. 43 Harris argued that § 270.20 (1) (f) only ex-
cludes jurors for cause when they entertain views for or against the
death penalty that "preclude s]" them from performing their du-
ties, which is a higher standard for juror exclusions.44 The court,
however, concluded that the trial court applied the right standard
and upheld all of the for-cause challenges. 45
36. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 478.
37. Id. at 478 (relying on Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)).
38. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 481-82.
39. Id. (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)). The court further stated
that in Adams v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a juror could not be chal-
lenged for cause based on their views about capital punishment unless those views
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as a juror. 448
U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
40. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 (1968).
41. N.Y. CONsr., art. I, § 2.
42. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 480.
43. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 480 (relying on Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613,
626 (1998) and People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 30 (1977); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 270.20 (1)(f) (Consol. 2002).
44. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 480.
45. Id. at 480.
2003]
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Harris also claimed that the trial court's instructions to the ve-
nire panels were erroneous and enabled potential jurors to manip-
ulate the outcomes of their voir dires, thus tainting the jury
selection process. 46 Specifically, Harris alleged that when the trial
court explained the death qualification process to the venire panels
during its preliminary instructions, the court highlighted the re-
quirements for jury selection. 47 The court rejected this argument
on the grounds that there was no shown prejudice.48 Further, the
court presumed that jurors follow their oaths and will answer the
voir dire questions honestly.49 The court did, however, advise trial
courts to "exercise caution" when conducting death/life qualifica-
tions to encourage honesty without rewarding correct answers.
50
Furthermore, Harris objected to group voir dire arguing that
capital cases require individual voir dire. 5 1 In rejecting Harris' con-
tention, the court examined the language of New York Criminal
Procedure Law § 270.16 (1), which permits a court to grant mo-
tions to parties "to examine the prospective jurors individually and
outside the presence of other prospective jurors regarding their
qualifications to serve as jurors."52 While the language of the stat-
ute permits individual juror questioning, the court concluded that
it did not demand it.
5 3
Finally, Harris argued that he was forced to use a peremptory
challenge to dismiss one particular juror because the trial court er-
roneously denied his for-cause challenge. 54 Since the court con-
cluded that all of the for-cause challenges were permissible, the
court rejected defendant Harris' argument.
5 5
46. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 481.
47. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 481.
48. Id. at 481.
49. Id. at 481.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 481-82.
52. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 270.16 (1) (McKinney 2002).
53. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452.
54. Id. at 485.




1. Denial of Expert Witness Rebuttal Testimony
Harris argued that the trial court's preclusion of rebuttal testi-
mony warranted a new trial.56 Harris retained two mental health
experts to provide expert testimony that he suffered from post-trau-
matic stress disorder. 57 The trial court limited the scope of one of
the expert's testimony.58 In New York, rebuttal evidence is limited
to evidence in denial of an assertion of a new affirmative fact the
opponent has tried to prove in reply to the case-in-chief. 59 The
court concluded that the proposed rebuttal expert testimony was
"both cumulative to, and duplicative of, evidence already presented
on defendant's direct case," and therefore, excludable.
60
2. Testimony of the Victims' Family Members
Before trial, Harris moved to limit the testimony of the victims'
family members. 61 New York law prohibits admitting testimony
about the victims' personal backgrounds which has no bearing on
the defendant's guilt or innocence. 62 However, the trial court de-
nied Harris' motion after the prosecution claimed that the family
members' testimony would focus on the identification of the vic-
tims. 63 Upon review, the court of appeals concluded that the family
members' testimony was immaterial to any critical issue at trial, and
therefore, should have been excluded.64 However, the court ulti-
mately concluded that the error was harmless in light of the over-
whelming evidence of Harris' guilt.
65
56. See Haris, 98 N.Y.2d at 487.
57. Id. Harris retained Dr. H. Wesley Clark, a psychiatrist and expert in post-trau-
matic stress disorder and Dr. Sanford Drob, a forensic psychologist, to examine him.
58. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 487.
59. See People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345 (1982). In some cases, rebuttal evi-
dence can be used for impeachment purposes, but at trial, Harris did not contend that
the expert's testimony should be used to impeach the testimony of the prosecution's
expert witness. Hams, 98 N.Y.2d 452.
60. Id. at 488.
61. Id. at 490.
62. See e.g., People v. Miller 6 N.Y.2d 152 (1959); People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437
(1927).
63. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 491.
64. Id. at 490-91.
65. Id. at 491 (relying on People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230 (1975)).
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D. Trial Court Instructions
The court of appeals also reviewed the trial court's instructions
on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
66
New York law requires a unanimous finding by the jury to accept an
affirmative defense. 67 Harris argued that when the trial court failed
to poll the jurors individually, there was a possibility that one or
more of the jurors found that he had established an extreme emo-
tional disturbance defense. 68 When the jury read the verdict, each
juror was individually asked whether the verdict was their verdict,
and each juror answered affirmatively. 69 The trial court also offered
supplemental jury instructions after the jury requested further clari-
fication on the issue of extreme emotional disturbance.70 The jury
was again instructed that their determination had to be unani-
mous.71 Therefore, the court concluded that the jury instructions,
the supplemental jury instructions, and the individual polling of
the jurors adequately showed that the jury "reasonably understood




The court of appeals concluded its opinion with a discussion of
whether New York's plea bargaining process during the trial was
constitutional. 73 The court relied on Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, where
it struck down "the post-death-notice plea bargaining provisions of
the death penalty statute as unconstitutional." 74 In Hynes, the court
cited the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Jackson, which stated
that the "inevitable effect of any statute that permits a defendant to
escape the threat of capital punishment is to discourage the asser-
66. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 492-93.
67. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 25.00 (McKinney 2002). However, the court of appeals
noted that the question remains open as to whether unanimity is required to reject an
affirmative defense. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, at fn. 20.
68. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 492-93.
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id. at 494.
71. Id. at 494.
72. Id. at 494.
73. Id.
74. 92 N.Y.2d 613 (1998).
[Vol. 47
CASE COMPILATION
tion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter
the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
75
In the instant case, the prosecution and the Attorney General
urged the court of appeals to review their decision in Hynes and to
restore the sections of the plea bargaining provisions. 76 The court
declined to reexamine Hynes and agreed that Harris' death sen-
tence could not stand, since the statute impermissibly discouraged
him from asserting his constitutional rights. 7 7 Accordingly, the
court unanimously voted to remit the case to the supreme court for
re-sentencing.
78
Nevertheless, Harris objected to the death penalty statute in its
entirety pursuant to the state constitution's cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause. 79 The prosecution argued that Harris was unable
to demonstrate that he suffered any harm, and therefore, he was
precluded from bringing a facial constitutional claim.80 However,
the court decided not to rule on the issue because the disposition
of the constitutional issue was not presented on the appeal.8'
IV. CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals struck down Darrel K. Harris'
death sentence on narrow constitutional grounds, leaving the
greater question of the constitutionality of the death penalty to a
future case.
Kate Gebert
75. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
76. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 496 (2002).
77. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 496.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 496; N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 5.
80. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 496.
81. Id. at 497.
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